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## **National Intelligence Daily** (Cable)

7 April 1982

**Top Secret** 

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Con	tents						
	Argentina-UK	: Military	and Diplo	matic Move	es		3
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ARGENTINA-UK: Military and Diplomation	: Moves
//Both the Argentine and British Governmentical fire for their handling of the Falk tions for a military showdown continue. Init apparently call for an assault on the islands the Argentine fleet. Meanwhile, London has so more of its friends and allies while several are moving to head off a confrontation.//	lands issue, but prepara- ial British plans after first engaging ecured the backing of
Military Preparations	
<pre>//In Argentina, troops, jet fight continue to be moved southward toward These include a crack paratrooper regis squadron of fighter bombers.// Comment: //While the task force</pre>	Rio Gallegos. ment and a full
Falklands, British military planners w solutions to the problems of getting t neutralizing Argentine airpower, and a intelligence.//	ill be seeking roops ashore, cquiring critical
<pre>//The Argentine deployments are is tary plans to use southern Argentina, Gallegos, as a staging area to the Fall</pre>	especially Rio
Soviet Interest	
//Soviet media commentary on the a harsher line against the UK. An Argofficial has told the US that a Soviet that arrived in Buenos Aires last Fridato expand economic dealings with Argenbroached the subject of providing some ance. He also said the Soviets offered Buenos Aires with intelligence support forces.//	entine military trade delegation ay for talks offered tina and may have military assist- d to provide
	continued
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olitical Developments				
//Prime Minister alls for her resignat he government had advut failed to take act arliament gave Thatcherous Tory backbenche ott resign. A full-se held today.//	ion yesterd ance warning ion. Conse er a "loud ors demanded	ay amid g of Ar rvative ovation that D	charges that gentine plans members of " although nu- efense Secret	- ary
//Argentine office bility to control integratine Interior Min colitical leaders yest upport for the invasicaders warned, howeve a based on an acceptatovernment.//	ernal polit ister who me erday in an on made some r, that true	ical de et with effort e headw e natio	velopments. To non-Communist to build civers ay. The party nal unity must	The t ilian y t
Comment: //The o ensure but for now th ehind Thatcher. A mi hat the government ha nd did nothing to cou abinet changes and co	e Tories are litary setba d advance wa nter it, how	e incli ack or arning wever,	ned to rally clear evidence of the invasion would lead to	e on
//At this stage, osition to reject gov hemselves and slowing hey are probably driv xchange for backing Gent can be reached, to nvasion and in Galtie bly.//	ernment apportunity down the ling a hard latieri's achieri stake	eals wi iberali bargain dventur in the	thout discred: zation proces: , however, in e. If an agre success of the	iting s. ee- e
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Diplomatic Activity		
		2
//The EC Commission has already p the British stand and is considering a sanctions. The Dutch and West German halted arms shipments to Argentina and supplier of arms will follow suit.//	request for Governments have	2
//In Latin America, Colombian, an plan to ask the OAS Permanent Council sion to study the Falklands controvers former chief canal negotiator has appr mediate the dispute. Paraguay has ten that the provisions of the Rio Treaty aid in the event of attack by an outsi apply to the Falklands because Buenos	to create a commis- y, and Panama's cached the US to tatively decided calling for mutual de power do not	
		2
Comment: //Santiago's foot-dragg tance to abandon its neutral position possible conflict, but it no doubt hop will be taught a lesson that will keep to similar tactics in the Beagle Chann	in advance of any es that Argentina it from resorting	2
//The economic steps taken by Bon be welcomed in London, and are likely many other EC and NATO members. They part of London's strategy of escalatin economic pressure on Buenos Aires and Western support for the UK.//	to be emulated by form an important g diplomatic and	2
//Diplomatic initiatives are like the British fleet approaches, and Para discourage invoking the Rio Treaty is peated. Most countries are trying to the dispute and avoid military involve affect regional diplomatic relationshi come.//	guay's efforts to likely to be re- find a way to end ments that could	2
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Castro Favors Negotiations on El Salvador

President Castro, in a major address on Sunday, unequivocally committed Cuba to "work in the search for a negotiated political solution to the problems of El Salvador, Central America, and the area." He said that Cuba, as well as Nicaragua and the Salvadoran guerrillas, supported the Mexican peace initiative and claimed to have moderated his rhetoric in deference to President Lopez Portillo's suggestion. An unnamed "senior Cuban official" echoed Castro's message privately to journalists in Havana, baiting his remarks with the claim that Cuba does not see a "socialist solution" in Latin America in the short run, but rather "pluralism."

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Comment: Havana's growing interest in negotiations on El Salvador reflects the Castro regime's chagrin over the failure of the guerrillas to win a military victory, and a belief that maintenance of the status quo there is not to the guerrillas' advantage. Negotiations, on the other hand, provide time for the guerrillas to regroup and rebuild, offer the chance of political gains for insurgents, and—by prolonging the confrontation—buy time in which public opinion in the US can be exploited to undercut Washington's resolve on further military support for El Salvador.

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Despite Cuban claims to have halted arms supplies to the Salvadoran rebels, Havana can be expected to continue to promote armed struggle in Central America. In addition, Havana will continue to try to develop private contacts with political and military leaders in the region to inflame personal and political rivalries and sow distrust of the US.

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Emergency Economic Measures in Nicaraqua

In order to increase income to pay for new, unbudgeted expenses caused by the state of emergency decreed last month, the Nicaraguan Government has imposed new taxes on all assets—including Nicaraguan assets held abroad and foreign-owned assets in Nicaragua—and a 10-percent surcharge on all other taxes. The government

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also has banned all vacations for the dure emergency, including the traditional Easte to maintain production levels.	
Comment: Continuing economic deterior ened military preparedness, and Managua's large sums are being held abroad caused to take these steps. Taxing assets will be threatening to private-sector interests, the action as partial nationalization.	belief that ne government oe particularly
Honduras and Nicaragua Recall Ambassadors	
Managua "urgently" recalled its Ambas Tegucigalpa on Monday after citing the Homent's "inability" to stop cross-border re Sandinista insurgents. Honduras responded its Ambassador to Nicaragua the following	nduran Govern- aids by anti- d by r <u>ecalling</u>
Comment: These moves reflect the incof tension between the two countries arising military and Nicaraquan insurgent active common border.	ing from stepped-


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China has proposed eld in New Delhi on 10 nd overall bilateral reay that they do not experijing, in its public and recent Indian foreign	that the r May to dis elations. pect substa and private	next rou scuss bo Both si antial p e commen	nd of tall rder probl des priva- rogress, l ts, is por	lems cely out ctray-
China has proposed eld in New Delhi on 10 nd overall bilateral reay that they do not expeijing, in its public and recent Indian foreignerms.  Comment: At a minary and the comment of the	that the r May to dis elations. pect substa and private gn policy m	next rouscuss bo Both si antial pecommen moves in	nd of tall rder probl des privat rogress, l ts, is por more posi	lems cely out ctray- itive
China has proposed eld in New Delhi on 10 nd overall bilateral reay that they do not experily in its public and recent Indian foreigners.  Comment: At a minimise another opportunity out chances of improve ew Delhi, while indirect	that the r May to dis elations. pect substa and private gn policy m imum, the t nity to inc ed relatior ctly encour	next rouscuss bo Both siantial pecommen moves in talks wo crease Sons between	nd of tall rder proble des priva- rogress, l ts, is por more pos:  uld give to oviet cond en Beijing ndia to po	lems cely out ctray- itive  the cern g and
China has proposed eld in New Delhi on 10 and overall bilateral reay that they do not experiging, in its public and recent Indian foreigners.  Comment: At a minimise another opportunious chances of improve ew Delhi, while indirect ore distance between its appect tough bargaining.	that the r May to diselations. pect substand private gn policy m imum, the t nity to inced relation ctly encour tself and t , however,	next rouscuss bo Both siantial pe commen moves in talks wo crease Sons between aging I the USSR and may	nd of tall rder proble des privat rogress, l ts, is por more post  uld give to oviet cond en Beijing ndia to po be reluct	lems cely out ctray- itive  che cern g and it
eld in New Delhi on 10 nd overall bilateral reay that they do not expeijing, in its public and recent Indian foreignms.	that the r May to diselations. pect substand private gn policy m imum, the t nity to inced relation ctly encour tself and t , however,	next rouscuss bo Both siantial pe commen moves in talks wo crease Sons between aging I the USSR and may	nd of tall rder proble des privat rogress, l ts, is por more post  uld give to oviet cond en Beijing ndia to po be reluct	lems cely out ctray- itive  che cern g and it

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VIETNAM: Foreign Minister's Travels	
Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co today in Paris to begin a two-week visit to Europe, including talks with EC officials i	Western
He will then travel to Moscow and New Delhi	
Comment: //The Vietnamese probably howill result in new aid commitments and improved European concern, however, over Hanoi' problems in meeting debt payments and its i effectively use aid already received makes of major new assistance remote. Thach also to ask the West Europeans to reconsider the to recognize Vietnam's client regime in Phnthey probably will not agree to do so.//	oved relations. s recent nability to the possibility is likely ir refusal

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SPECIAL ANALYSIS	
EL SALVADOR: The Military Balance	25>
The guerrillas' failure to disrupt the elections and the high voter turnout have provided a major psychological boost to the government. The insurgents retain strong military capabilities, however, and a decisive change is unlikely soon. Meanwhile, the guerrillas probably will take advantage of the current political uncertainty over the composition and policies of the new government to attempt some spectacular action.  //The failure to disrupt the election and the unexpectedly high turnout dealt a major political and psychological blow to the insurgent cause. The insur-	25)
gents expended considerable manpower and material in their effort to prevent the voting  //The military balance, however, probably will not	25)
shift quickly and decisively in the government's favor. The insurgent's preparations to disrupt the election left them with better arms, more trained cadre, and new supply routes. The flow of the Cuban and Nicaraguan arms is likely to continue, although perhaps at a reduced volume. Despite the successful election, the insurgents still enjoy some degree of international political and propaganda support.//	25)
Military Improvements	
//The Salvadoran military has strengthened its capabilities over the past year and appears to have gained ground on the insurgents. One of its greatest weaknesses had been insufficient manpower to conduct offensive operations while defending population centers and economic targets. Since last year, however, the Army has nearly doubled, and the combined strength of the military and security forces is now over 28,000.//	
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//To improve command and control of the Army has formed two additional briga bringing the current total to six. A quibattalion activated last year has been coreasingly effective sweep operations.//	ide headquarters nick-reaction conducting in-	
//Two additional quick-reaction uni and regular infantry battalions througho are being strengthened and reequipped wi machineguns, mortars, and recoilless rif tion, the US is training 500 officer can effort to reduce a shortage of junior co	out the country th US M-16 rifle les. In addi- didates in an	
//The acquisition of 14 UH-1H helic past year has made the Army much more mosmall units to be deployed by air and wo to be evacuated quickly. Although some destroyed in an insurgent raid in late J were soon replaced, and the inventory is to 20.//	buile, allowing bunded personnel helicopters were fanuary, they	e 25X
//The Army, however, still has sign Soldiers often have to be rushed into copleting basic training. Coordination amis weak, generally allowing insurgents toperations.//	ombat before com- nong large units	
//Inadequate logistic support often to end offensive operations prematurely. cannot interdict querrilla supplies deli and air.//	The government	Υ Ε 25Χ΄
Insurgent Forces		
//The guerrillas also have made comments over the past year. They still ap regular force of between 4,000 and 5,000 part-time militia of between 5,000 and 1	pear to have a , and hav <u>e a</u>	ve- 25X
//The insurgents have divided the control fronts, each with a commander and general rilla units are mostly concentrated in a areas from which operations are launched	il staff. Guer- bout eight base	<b>.</b>
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eight base camps have	areas more been ident	than 40 we ified, and	ell-defend there may	led guerri be many n	lla more.//
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Current Situation
//The guerrillas need some spectacular successes to preserve their credibility and restore morale. They had hoped to seize the eastern cities of Usulutan and San Francisco before the elections, but the failure of diversionary attacks elsewhere and the arrival of government reinforcements forced them to retreat. They nevertheless remain strong in these areas, and it will take a major government effort to dislodge them.//
//In addition, the insurgents may try to take advantage of the initial political uncertainty surrounding the new constituent assembly. Nevertheless, guerrillas probably will remain on the defensive for some time.//

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